Chalmers Clark, PhD | In our last issue of Ethically Speaking... we took the doctrine of employment-at-will (EAW) and put it under the ethical lens of justice. We then brought the concept down to its roots in everyday notions such as 'fairness' and 'even handed treatment' or 'an even playing field'.
Initially, we saw a possible claim to fairness, in EAW, with the equal freedom of each party to remove themselves from an employer-employee relationship. However, history has shown a distinct power imbalance (uneven playing field) that largely favors employers. We concluded that in practice, the fairness claims for EAW are implausible. Additionally, when unemployment rates are high and the economy is weak, as things are today, the uneven playing field is all the more unbalanced.
Let us push the concept of justice a bit further, this time in terms of the justice of individual treatment. Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), argued forcefully that it is ethically required that we treat persons justly. A key aspect of Kant’s sense of just treatment is that all persons must be treated with respect. That is, persons are never to be treated as mere things we can use and dispose of as we please. He argues that persons have an inherent dignity not characteristic of mere objects. On the contrary, factory equipment as mere property does not have inherent dignity and is subject to purchase and disposal as management sees fit. Many associate the view that persons deserve respect with religion. While Kant was a religious man, in his philosophy he seeks to clarify respect independent of any particular religious faith. Kant argues that the philosophical clue to the inherent dignity and moral worth of persons resides in the nature of persons as rational beings. It is difficult to clarify exactly what it means to be a rational being, but certain features are clear. At a minimum, rational beings have the capacity to use reason in decision making, especially moral decisions. According to Kant, as rational beings we have the capacity not only to act in accordance with good ethical reasons, but to act for the sake of those reasons* (what Kant called “acting for the sake of duty”). When we act for the sake of good ethical reasons, we step beyond motivations from appetite, inclination, desire, fear, and habit. Persons, thus, have the capacity to consider right and wrong quite unlike other beings (do higher primates have such a capacity? Whales? Dolphins?). With this capacity and freedom to choose right from wrong, we now have a fairly clear view of another key notion that arises in thinking about respect for persons: autonomy. In the meaning of the term itself, we see (auto=self) + (nomos=law). Thus, 'autonomy of persons' implies that persons are self-legislating as moral choice makers.
But now comes the rub; our freedom to choose right and wrong causes us to acquire responsibility for our choices in ways that non-rational creatures do not.** One might say that for Kant, a litmus test of whether a being is a moral agent depends upon whether that being can be considered responsible for its actions. In this sense, to treat persons with respect is to treat them as beings that are morally self-determining and responsible for those determinations; and indeed, for failing to make such determinations (negligence).
Such an approach puts a high premium on promoting autonomy with due diligence both in the work place and otherwise. Truthfulness and honesty are key, as well as transparency, disclosure, lack of duress, and sincerity in promises. It should be clear now that if a person is to be autonomous, and that rationality is key to their autonomy, then the exercise of reason in moral decision making should be encouraged and not impeded. How does all this Kant-lingo apply to our question of employment-at-will? Actually, it is pretty decisive: If a rational person’s autonomy is denied in important matters affecting their lives, such as employment, they are denied the status and dignity of moral agency.
In a nut shell, if a person can be terminated from their employment for any reason, or indeed for no reason at all, it appears that the doctrine of EAW flies in the face of respecting a persons’ right to have a voice in decisions that can affect their lives profoundly. In Kantian terms, persons deserve the respect to be heard and answered before such crucial decisions are made. As persons are not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without fair representation and due process of law, the Kantian argument implies that EAW snips off fair involvement in the process and allows persons, like factory equipment, to be treated as a mere means to the ends and goals of others rather than as ends in themselves.
To sum up, the Kantian ethical approach indicates that EAW fails to take seriously the idea that persons warrant the dignity and respect that having a voice in employment decisions can afford them. This seems to imply that the ethics of “respect for persons” thus requires that termination should be “for cause” rather than “at-will.” While unions indeed face ethical challenges of their own--on other fronts--on the question of employment-at-will, I think we can score one for unionization. “Ethically Speaking...” has come about as a result of a meeting focused on delivering greater ethical consideration into the ongoing conversation regarding the goals and concerns of labor and labor relations. The meeting took place between President of the New York State AFL-CIO, Denis Hughes; Director of the Work Force Development Institute, Ed Murphy; and Adjunct Associate Professor of Philosophy Union College/Participating Faculty Member Union Graduate College, Chalmers Clark. “Ethically Speaking…” encourages reader comments both critical and affirmative. *In other words, an employer (A) might follow the guidelines set forth in collective bargaining to terminate only "for cause" because it is clear that there will be legal repercussions if violations are discovered. But for employer (B), the motive is distinctly different if he or she acts because she believes the guidelines are morally correct. So, while (A) and (B) both act in similar ways, the intention of (B) is to act for the sake of the reasons not merely to act in accordance with their dictates (from fear of reprisal). (A) acts in accordance with the reasons, but his or her motive is other than for the rightness of the reasons themselves. **It might not be clear to everyone that sharks or puppies or horses, or even chimpanzees, do or do not act according to reason, in some sense of that word. What is clear, however, is that such creatures do not act for the sake of the rightness of reasons. While the behavior of these animals might please or anger us, we do not say that they are responsible for their actions in the way that a rational person who has the capacity to choose and act for the sake of reason is. |
